Tuesday, April 08, 2008

Energy, Green & Oil

A great overview of current research, the global political situation around energy independence and global warming.

Energy Independence Isn’t Very Green
By Steve Stein
Conflicting priorities are confusing policy


THERE’S BROAD AGREEMENT that America should reduce its dependence on imported oil, but far less agreement on why. Are we combating global warming, or are we distancing ourselves from hostile and unstable regimes? The popular reply is that it hardly matters — we need to do both and the goals reinforce each other. But these two national energy goals are not only different but frequently in conflict, and effective policy will not be forged until those conflicts are addressed. Meanwhile, we ’ll continue to see watered down legislative efforts similar to the Energy Act of 2007 and its predecessors. When dependence on foreign oil first became a major issue in 1973, the country imported less than a third of its petroleum; it now imports over 60 percent.

It was never easy to convince the public that we should curb oil use for security reasons alone. As foreign sources grew more numerous, credible energy experts insisted that this diversity of supply provided ample security. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it was widely accepted that no single country, nor even the entire OPEC cartel, could pose a real threat. The fact that America was devoting increasing military resources to protecting the international oil trade was viewed as just another consequence of being the “sole remaining superpower.”

So in pleading the case for lowered oil consumption, energy security advocates gratefully accepted a new rationale — concerns about climate change. In 1973, those concerns were barely a blip on the political radar screen, but they have grown steadily since about 1988. “Stop global warming” has become a remarkably effective rallying cry, even inspiring award-winning documentaries and TV specials. Commercial interests have also latched onto this movement. Automobile makers find it easier to market gas-electric hybrid cars in the interest of saving the planet from excessive warming than in saving the country from Middle Eastern extremists. The ethanol lobby, too, identifies its raison d ’etre more with greening the planet than with energy security. Combating climate change somehow seems more inclusive and less confrontational than mere energy security. For all these reasons, advocates of the latter (let ’s call them the “oil independents”) have eagerly accepted a strategic partnership with the climate change establishment (the “climate greens”).

Unfortunately, however, the partnership rests on unstable ground.

THREE FAULT LINES

THERE ARE THREE conspicuous fault lines between the positions of oil independents and climate greens. The first and most obvious is that mitigating climate change requires curtailing not just consumption of oil and gas, but also of coal, which has even higher carbon dioxide emissions. Since C02 is fingered as the main culprit in man-made global warming, it isn’t surprising that coal becomes continually less welcome. But America has far more coal than it has oil or natural gas, and from the viewpoint of energy independence, that can ’t be ignored. The partners’ attempts to bridge their differences on coal are not yet promising.

Second, oil independents and climate greens face conflict over oil substitutes that emit no carbon at all. Climate-change activists have deep environmentalist roots. These often lead them to oppose large hydroelectric dams and even wind and solar projects. And one important noncarbon fuel — nuclear energy — remains anathema to the environmental establishment. The most recent report of the UN’s International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) halfheartedly notes nuclear energy’s positive attributes, but few climate greens concur. This is more typical view:

“We believe that the financial and safety risks associated with nuclear power are so grave that nuclear power should not be a part of any solution to address global warming. There is no need to jeopardize our health, safety, and economy with increased nuclear power when we have cleaner, cheaper solutions to reduce global warming pollution. ” — June 2005 statement signed by 313 national, international, regional, and state environmental organizations, including Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth.

Of course, not all global warming activists agree. Some, like NASA scientist James Lovelock, are convinced that the planet’s atmosphere is fast approaching a tipping point, beyond which the warming trend will become irreversible. Lovelock sees nuclear as the only quick fix, but his views have made little headway. Environmental allies may adopt similar rhetoric about urgency, but are remarkably nimble in accepting a more long-term view of matters when urgency appears to force unpleasant choices.

This contretemps over nuclear power indirectly illuminates the third fault line in the partnership between energy independents and climate greens: the partners ’ vastly different time horizons. Ironically, it isn’t the nuclear issue itself that sets up this conflict between climate greens and oil independents — most energy security advocates have given up on nuclear as a primary solution because fission raises its own set of security problems. But energy security advocates ’ sense of urgency about our energy problems is nevertheless as strong as Lovelock ’s, and they see the need to focus intently on what must happen within ten years.

Climate greens, on the other hand, are accustomed to looking out over four decades and more. A recent IPCC report predicts a rise in temperature of 2–11.5 degrees Fahrenheit, and a rise in the sea level of 7–23 inches by 2100. While the IPCC does include mitigations that should be accomplished by 2030, much of its report addresses changes that would only begin at that time. This patient approach has become more entrenched after shorter range benchmarks proved feckless. The Kyoto protocol of 1997 envisioned reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) to their 1990 levels, with a further 15 percent reduction by 2012; but few signatories have come anywhere near that goal. Canada, for example, committed to lowering its GHG emissions to 94 percent of their 1990 level. In 2004, its actual GHG emissions were 26.6 percent above the 1990 level.

If reducing America’s dependence on foreign oil is viewed as a security matter, then it makes little sense to focus on what might happen 40 years hence. Seismic geopolitical changes can occur far more rapidly. If energy self-sufficiency is important at all, it is important because of events that can easily occur within a decade.